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This paper investigates how the choice of public expenditure instrument is affecting capture 
in the public education sector.  We analyze data on two public funding schemes in 
Madagascar.  We find that there is much more capture of in-kind transfers than of cash 
transfers.  Capture of both instruments declines with better local access to media information 
and with higher local literacy rates.  However, capture of cash grants falls rapidly with a raise 
in the level of education of the intended beneficiaries, while this effect is significantly 
weaker for capture of in-kind funds.  Our findings suggest that intensive monitoring and 
increased public access to information should be combined with the right instrument for 
public funding implementation in order to eradicate capture and corruption.  
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  Corruption and poverty are strongly related (e.g., Rose-Ackerman, 1975; Klitgaard, 
1991; Bardhan, 1997; Tanzi, 1998; Stapenhurst and Kpundeh, 1999; Svensson, 2003, 2005; 
Olken, 2006).  Corruption reduces growth (e.g., Shleifer and Vishny, 1993; Mauro, 1995, 
1997; Tanzi and Davoodi, 1997; Wei, 1997) while corruption itself reduces with income and 
education (Glaeser et al., 2004; Glaeser and Saks, 2004).  Recently, the importance of 
controlling corruption has been emphasized; among other things to improve the efficiency of 
public service delivery programs.  In a well-documented study, Reinikka and Svensson 
(2004) find that in the early 1990s in Uganda only 13 percent of non-wage public 
expenditures on primary education actually reached the schools.  The bulk of the public 
grants was captured by local government officials and politicians who were supposed to 
disburse the funds to the schools.  Most studies in Africa, including Tanzania, and Ghana, 
confirm that local capture is a serious problem in educational programs as between 50% and 
75% of non-wage funds were diverted (Reinikka and Svensson, 2004), while Francken et al. 
(2009) find much lower levels of local capture in Madagascar.  
Much recent analysis has focused on reducing local capture by monitoring of the 
beneficiaries of the services (Reinikka and Svensson, 2005).  Increasing the information flow 
on the disbursement of public funds to the intended beneficiaries is expected to empower 
citizens at the bottom of the service delivery chain in their interactions with local officials 
and politicians and, thereby, to increase pressure on them to pass on the funds.  It is argued 
that mass media can play an important role in this process as a channel of information 
(Besley and Burgess, 2002; Strömberg, 2004; Francken et al., 2009). 
 In this paper we focus on how the choice of instrument for public expenditure 
implementation affects local capture.  In particular, we investigate the difference in capture 
  2of cash versus in-kind transfers, because of differences in information and monitoring costs 
related to the nature of the funding instrument.   
There is an extensive literature on the optimality of cash versus in-kind transfers.  
This literature focuses primarily on comparing the relative efficiency of the different transfer 
instruments, either with perfect information (e.g., Thurow, 1974) or when there is imperfect 
information about the intended beneficiaries (e.g., Blackorby and Donaldson, 1988).   
However, these studies ignore the issue of differences in information and monitoring costs 
related to the implementation of these instruments.  The latter is linked to the issue of how 
transparency of public funding schemes may affect capture (e.g., Stiglitz, 1999, 2002; Islam, 
2003; Bellver and Kaufmann, 2005). 
Our analysis compares capture of public expenditures on education in Madagascar in 
two programs: one where public funding of local school expenditures was through cash 
transfers and another where public funding was under the form of in-kind transfers.  The 
analysis uses data collected in a budget tracking survey in 2003.  The survey measured the 
extent to which public spending on education reached the local schools.  We compare 
capture of cash flows and in-kind contributions from 23 decentralized district facility levels 
to 156 public primary schools.   
We first analyze the difference in average levels of capture and then whether capture 
itself is differently affected by the information, and/or monitoring costs of the beneficiaries 
of the services.   
Our first finding is that local capture of in-kind programs was much higher than 
capture of cash transfers.  Ninety percent of the total amount of intended cash transfers to the 
schools arrived at school level, although in one-fifth of the schools the amount received did 
not correspond with the amount declared as sent by the district facility.  Capture of in-kind 
transfer programs was considerably higher: 40% of the schools reported having received less 
  3material than allocated at the district level.  Anecdotal evidence suggests that in a majority of 
these cases the diverted funds were used for purposes unrelated to education or for private 
gain of local district officials. 
Our second finding is that the presence of mass media significantly decreased capture 
of cash as well as in-kind programs.  Independent regional media inform and empower the 
local recipients of the public services and hence mass media can be important tools in the 
fight against capture and corruption.   
Third, capture of cash and in-kind programs is negatively related with the level of 
education of the intended beneficiaries.  However, we find a significantly weaker effect on 
capture of in-kind grants.  This could be an indication that intensive bottom-up monitoring is 
not sufficient to eradicate capture of public funds.    
Our findings taken together have implications for the debate on capture in public 
services (e.g., Rose-Ackerman, 1975; Klitgaard, 1991; Bardhan, 1997; Tanzi, 1998; 
Stapenhurst and Kpundeh, 1999; Svensson, 2003, 2005; Olken, 2006).  Intensive monitoring, 
together with increased public access to information through the mass media do not appear to 
be sufficient.  Our results suggest that these measures should be combined with the use of the 
right, i.e. easily traceable, public funding instrument (as in our case study cash grants) in 
order to eradicate capture.  
  The paper is organized as follows.  We first explain the policy framework in Section 
2.  We then describe the data, the methodology used to measure capture, and our basic results 
in Section 3.  Section 4 tries to explain the first findings by formulating hypotheses on the 
difference in information and monitoring costs related to the nature of the two public funding 
mechanisms.  We empirically test our hypotheses in Section 5 by analyzing the capture 
options the local government official faces and estimating a multinomial logit to account for 
  4all the different choices.  Finally, we present our results in Section 6 and formulate our 
conclusions in Section 7. 
 
2. The  Policy  Framework 
Madagascar has low school enrolment rates, even by African standards (e.g., Glick et 
al., 2000; Razafindravonona et al., 2001; Larson et al., 2006).  According to a recent World 
Bank (2002) study, only 60% of the urban children completed primary school.  In rural areas, 
where most people live, the rate is even much lower as only 12% of children in rural areas 
completed primary school.  
Following the Millennium agenda of “free” education, and a political crisis in 2002, 
the new Government of Madagascar legislated a fixed per student cash grant to every public 
primary school.  For every registered student, schools would receive approximately 2 USD in 
the capital city and 1.5 USD in the rest of the country.  
This program importantly changed the financing of public education in Madagascar.  
The public educational environment consists of two different levels of governance with 
decision power (World Bank, 2004).  First, the central authority is the Ministry of Education.  
Second, each district has a district education office (CISCO – Circonscription Scolaire), 
which is responsible for the distribution of money and material to the public primary schools 
situated in the communes of their district.
1  The financing traditionally had three components 
(Francken, 2003).  First, the government pays the teachers’ salaries.  Second, the government 
finances school equipment by providing a credit line to the district education offices 
(CISCOs).  The latter then buy and distribute the school equipment in-kind to the schools.  
The materials could vary from pens or books to chalk or blackboards.  In theory, the delivery 
of equipment is demand-driven as the distribution of materials to the schools happens 
                                                 
1 Madagascar counts 6 provinces, 111 districts and at the time of the survey 1392 communes.  Hence, on 
average there are 18 districts per province and there were 13 communes per district. 
  5according to the needs formulated by the beneficiaries i.e. the school council in cooperation 
with the parents-teachers association.
2  Third, all additional expenditures of the schools were 
covered by tuition fees paid by the parents of the students.  The objective of the new 
government policy was to ban parental contributions to schools and replace the latter by 
government grants.
3  The implementation started in August 2002, at the beginning of the 
school year 2002-2003.  Cash funds were transferred from the central government to the 
districts (CISCOs) and district officials were to transfer the payments to the public primary 
schools.  We will discuss the characteristics of both public funding schemes in greater detail 
in Section 4. 
The analysis in this paper concentrates on a comparison of local capture of (a) the 
cash payments and (b) the in-kind contributions during the academic year 2002-2003.  In 
particular, we will focus on the differences between cash and in-kind transfers and the 
differences in information and monitoring costs related to the nature of the public funding 
instrument.  In the next section, we first describe the data, and the methodology used to 
measure capture.  We then provide our basic results by comparing local capture of cash 
versus in-kind grants.  
 
3.  Measuring and Comparing Capture of Cash versus In-kind Transfers 
Our analysis quantifies two types of capture in the supply chain of the education 
sector in Madagascar.  First, we look at discrepancies between the cash funds recorded as 
sent by the district facility levels and as received by the public primary schools.  Second, we 
                                                 
2 The schools were not able to order equipment that was unrelated to education.  In a poor country as 
Madagascar with limited public educational funds the fact of demand-driven delivery should also be interpreted 
with caution as the schools often did not receive the equipment they ordered because of a lack of funds at 
district level.  
3 The changes in the education sector of Madagascar were similar to the educational changes in other African 
countries as e.g. Zambia (Das et al., 2004). 
  6try to match the in-kind contributions purchased by the district officers, on their credit line 
for school equipment, and received by the schools.   
 
3.1. Data   
  To collect specific information on the public funding flows in the education sector, 
we organized a budget tracking survey on cash and in-kind transfers from district facility to 
school level in April/May 2003.  The purpose of the survey was to provide nationally 
representative data on budget allocations, and leakages in the education sector of 
Madagascar, more specifically in the context of the new educational policy.  The survey also 
allowed us to analyze how the choice of instrument for public expenditure implementation 
affected local capture.  To ensure compatibility, the surveys at district, and school level were 
held at the same time.  The survey was conducted in the whole of Madagascar.
4  In total, 24 
districts (more than 20% of the total) and 185 public primary schools were surveyed, of 
which 73% were located in rural areas.  After data checking and testing, we ended up with 
reliable data on 23 districts and 156 schools.  
 
3.2. Measuring  capture 
We calculated the following indicator of capture, c
ij, for school j; 
c
ij = 1 – 
j i
j
school for    intended   CISCO   from   funds
school by    received   funds
                               (1) 
where CISCOi is the district facility level i.e. the organization higher up the chain 
from schoolj.  Capture (c) is indexed by i and j as it can vary by donor and recipient.  An 
indicator of 1 indicates full capture; 0 means no leakage.  Using this indicator, we calculated 
capture at each school.   
                                                 
4 In each province, 4 districts and 13 communes were surveyed. 
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and distributed by the district education offices.  As mentioned before, these materials vary 
from a pen to a football or a blackboard.  As it was impossible to value the in-kind 
contributions correctly and consistently in monetary terms, we constructed a qualitative 
capture indication as a 0-1 variable indicating 1 when there was a significant discrepancy 
between the CISCO and the school, i.e. if the district officer recorded to have sent more 
material than the public primary school noted as received; and 0 otherwise.   
Small deviations (as e.g. one missing football or a missing pen) were considered as 
measurement error.  The disappearance of more than one small item, one large item or more 
was considered as capture.  We believe that in a country where – according to our interviews 
– some schools only received one pen, one football, five books and a chair during the 
previous school year, our measure of capture is accurate.
5   
We are aware that discrepancies between the in-kind transfers recorded as sent by the 
district facility levels and as received by the schools could be due to weak planning models 
and incompetence, as well as very poor accounting procedures at both levels instead of 
capture.  However, clear cases of incompetence were excluded from the analyses.  One 
district facility level did not keep any accounting on the material that it distributed as it 
claimed not to be able to keep the books.  As we were unable to find any in-kind distribution 
records, it was excluded from the analysis.  Twelve schools were excluded for the same 
reason.  Moreover, our survey contained a control question (to be answered by the 
enumerators
6) on the clarity of the entire district or school bookkeeping.
7  We constructed a 
dummy variable that equals one if the enumerators perceived it as clear; and zero otherwise.  
                                                 
5 On the other hand, there was a small minority of schools reporting to have received more than the CISCO 
stated to have sent.  A more detailed investigation of these cases showed that the reported supplies equaled the 
sum of material received during the last two or three school years.  Taking this into consideration, those schools 
received the correct amount of material during the school year 2002-2003.  
6 The enumerators were well trained to accurately evaluate the clarity of the bookkeeping. 
7 The entire bookkeeping i.e. all records on the distribution or receipt of cash, school equipment, and books. 
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poor accounting procedures.  This matter will be discussed in further detail in the next 
paragraph.     
The accounting at school level is generally accurate, as the schools have no clear 
incentives to misreport their resources.  The schools are subject to the supervision of the 
parents-teachers association and the accounting is not the basis for any type of funding and it 
is not submitted to any district or central authority.
8  Our interviews and anecdotal evidence 
indicate that there is very little incentive and possibility for potentially corrupt school 
directors to embezzle part of the school funds.  In contrast, our interviews confirmed that 
significant capture existed at the district level.  
  
3.3. Basic  results 
Our first result is that local capture of in-kind contributions was much higher than 
capture of cash transfers.  Overall, there was little capture of the latter at district level.  By 
April 2003, the divergence between the cash grants recorded as sent by the district facility 
levels and as received by the schools was very low: 90% of the funds arrived at school level.  
Although in 21% of the schools the amount received did not correspond with the amount 
declared as sent by the district facility (Figure 1 and Table 1).  On the other hand, the 
divergence in the bookkeeping on the in-kind contributions was considerably higher as 40% 
of the schools reported having received less material than allocated at district level.  
The correlation between cash and in-kind capture is very low and not significant.  
Only 8% of the schools reported to have suffered from capture of both cash and in-kind 
funds (Table 1).  
Table 2 shows the relationship between the clarity of the entire bookkeeping as 
perceived by the enumerators and the discrepancies found in the delivery of cash and in-kind 
                                                 
8 The situation in Madagascar is similar to the situation in Uganda as described in Reinikka & Svensson (2004). 
  9transfers from district to school level.  Respectively 69% and 75% of the schools that 
reported having received less in-kind or cash transfers than allocated at district level were 
perceived as having clear bookkeeping.  On the contrary 31% and 25% of the schools with 
in-kind or cash capture reports were perceived as having unclear accounting procedures.  
Overall, a high 73% of the schools were perceived as having clear bookkeeping compared to 
56% of the districts.  This result could indicate incompetence at district level.  However, the 
accounting procedures are supervised by the school and district director respectively and a 
vast majority of district directors have a considerably higher education degree
9 and are 
therefore expected to have a better understanding of accounting than the school directors.  
Hence, these results seem to suggest that the irregularities in the delivery of cash and in-kind 
transfers from district to school level are not driven by incompetence at the decentralized 
levels, but are mainly due to capture of funds.  This is consistent with the findings from our 
field interviews that significant capture existed at district level.  However, we do not 
underestimate the fact that there is a general lack of competence in African bureaucracies and 
we are aware that some cases may only reflect incompetence.  Table 2 shows that 62% of the 
schools that reported discrepancies in the receipt of both cash and in-kind transfers were 
perceived as having unclear accounting procedures.  As in these particular cases irregularities 
are probably due to incompetence rather than capture, we will test the robustness of our 
results when excluding the latter observations from the analyses.    
In-kind capture could then either result from effective theft of materials by the district 
officer or from over-invoicing of materials in the district’s accounts i.e. the district officer 
noted a higher invoice price compared to the real price of the in-kind contributions he sent to 
the school.
10  It was not always possible to identify the exact method of in-kind capture, but 
evidence from our field interviews suggests common practice of over-invoicing.  To assess 
                                                 
9 A vast majority of the district directors (90%) have a university degree.  
10 Anecdotal evidence suggests that diverted funds were used for purposes unrelated to education or for private 
gain of local district officials. 
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material in some of the districts in our sample.  Table 3 shows the mean invoice price 
reported by the CISCO and the mean retail price for some standard school supplies in the 
district: the differences range from 12% to 82%.  While we were unable to completely 
control for quality differences, this evidence seems to suggest that the district education 
office was subject to practices of over-invoicing.  Unfortunately, we could not identify the 
exact method of in-kind capture for all districts in our sample, so we created an in-kind 
capture dummy variable that equals one in case of effective theft of the materials and/or 
over-invoicing; and zero otherwise.   
In order to compare capture of cash and in-kind transfers, we also created a cash 
capture dummy variable that equals one in case of local capture of cash funds; and zero 
otherwise.  In the remainder of this paper we will continue our analyses with both dummy 
variables. 
Our data show strong regional differences suggesting that the variations in capture are 
not random but reflect structural differences of the schools, the local communities, and the 
districts.  This is consistent with anecdotal evidence based on our personal interviews.   
In the following section, we will try to explain our basic results by discussing the 
characteristics - more specifically those related to the information and monitoring costs - of 
the two different instruments of public funding implementation in greater detail.   
 
4.  Hypotheses on the Difference in Capture between Funding Instruments 
Our first hypothesis why there is more capture of in-kind contributions than of cash 
funds relates to the difference in information costs of the two different instruments of public 
funding implementation.  The accompanying measures of the cash grants scheme appear to 
  11have decreased the latter’s information costs which may have resulted in a lower incidence of 
local capture of cash funds compared to in-kind contributions.   
The cash grant scheme was implemented together with several accompanying 
measures in order to ensure that the funds would actually arrive at the school level and to 
prevent capture along the chain.  First, the Ministry of Education sent letters to the district 
facilities and the schools explaining the new policy and required the CISCOs and the schools 
to post in a public place the amount of money received.  Second, since the mail distribution 
system is slow in Madagascar, the policy was also announced and explained via the mass 
media.  The mass media campaign was to stimulate monitoring from the intended recipients 
of the education funds, i.e. the local schools and parents.  The information on the 
abolishment of the public school tuition fee was reported widely in the written press and 
broadcasted on national and local radios and TV.  In sum, both measures were to increase 
public access to information i.e. ensure transparency and hence to decrease the information 
costs by the beneficiaries of the cash public funding scheme.   
On the contrary, the in-kind funding mechanism was characterized by a lack of public 
access to information.  As aforementioned, one district facility level did not keep any 
accounting on the school equipment it distributed and was excluded from the analysis.  In 
several other CISCOs the bookkeeping was extremely ambiguous and/or not publicly 
accessible.  Overall, our enumerators encountered lack of clarity in the bookkeeping of 
almost half (44%) of the district facility levels.  During our survey, schools were also asked 
to evaluate the in-kind distribution system of their respective CISCO and half of the public 
primary schools reported not to be satisfied.  One of the main reasons was the lack of 
transparency and accountability leading to increased information costs by the intended 
recipients and hence providing substantial opportunity for capture by the district bureaucrats 
(Francken, 2003).   
  12  Second, we hypothesize that the difference in monitoring costs makes it more likely 
that capture of in-kind transfers occurs, compared to local capture of cash grants.  Anecdotal 
evidence from our field interviews suggests that this is indeed often the outcome.  On the one 
hand, transfer of the cash payments to the schools was conditional upon submission of a 
budget plan from the schools.  A newly created institution, which was made up of parents of 
current and former students, of the director of the school, and of other people of the region, 
needed to present a work plan in which it explained the use of the funds.  This work plan was 
publicly accessible and evidence from our field interviews suggests that even for people with 
a minimal amount of education, cash transfers were relatively easy to monitor.   
On the other hand, we describe two cases that are typical for the situation concerning 
the in-kind funding scheme that we encountered in the field.  The first case is that of a school 
reporting that it asked the district facility level to buy and send glue.  By the time the glue 
arrived at school level, it exceeded the expiration date and was unusable.  For the school it 
was unclear whether the glue expired during storage at the district facility or whether the 
CISCO procured bad glue at a lower price from the supplier.  Our visits of the district 
education office and the respective supplier confirmed the latter, hence indicating capture at 
CISCO level.
11  The second case refers to a situation where the school reported to have 
requested and received 100 pieces of white chalk while the CISCO noted to have sent 100 
pieces of colored chalk which is considerably more expensive.  Both cases illustrate practices 
of over-invoicing and thus capture at district level while it was difficult for the schools to 
detect and monitor the actions of the CISCOs.  In sum, our findings suggest that higher 
monitoring costs for the beneficiaries of the in-kind funding scheme might make it more 
likely that local capture of in-kind contributions occurs, compared to capture of cash grants.   
                                                 
11 We encountered several similar cases during our field work.  While it could have been possible that the 
suppliers were not providing truthful information and the district directors only paid the correct price and 
received a false receipt, our field interviews with other district personnel confirmed collusion in a majority of 
the cases.  Moreover, as aforementioned 90% of the district directors had a university degree and were expected 
to have a considerable understanding of accounting. 
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monitoring costs for the intended recipients by analyzing the capture options the local district 
official faces and estimating a multinomial logit to account for all the different choices.   
    
5. Empirical  Model 
Our empirical model incorporates three different options for the district bureaucrat: 1) 
“no” capture i.e. neither cash, nor in-kind capture; 2) “in-kind” capture: capture of in-kind 
contributions but no capture of cash grants; 3) “cash” capture.  We combine two scenario’s 
i.e. cash without in-kind and cash with in-kind capture in option 3 because we have 
insufficient observations to include the latter scenario separately.  We believe that combining 
these two different scenario’s in option 3 is a reasonable approach as we are merely 
interested in cash versus in-kind capture.  We will nevertheless test for the robustness of our 
results when we drop the observations from the schools that suffered from both cash and in-
kind capture from our analyses. 
We estimate the probability of a district bureaucrat capturing cash and/or in-kind 
funds relative to the reference state of no capture using a multinomial logit model (see 
Greene (1997) for more details).  This model allows us to estimate a set of coefficients βj 
corresponding to each outcome category: 















                             (2) 
The estimated equations provide a set of probabilities for the J+1 choices for a decision 
maker with characteristics xi.  The model however is unidentified in the sense that there is 
more than one solution to βj that leads to the same probabilities for y = j.  A convenient 
normalization that solves the problem is to assume that β0 = 0.  This means that the 
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are now given by: 
















 for j = 1, 2,…, J 










                                (3) 
In terms of our analysis, the normalization means that we compare each outcome with 
the comparison group of bureaucrats at district level that do not capture funds.  Table 4 gives 
an overview of the different scenarios.  Our dependent variable is a school-specific measure.  
Furthermore, the model identifies several explanatory variables of which two key variables 
are related to the information and monitoring costs for the beneficiaries of the services.   
First, we use one key explanatory variable that relates to the difference in information 
costs of the two public funding instruments.  In particular we use an indicator of the effect of 
the mass media campaign that was put in place together with the cash grants scheme in order 
to decrease the information costs of the beneficiaries of the latter.  Several recent studies 
(e.g., Reinikka and Svensson, 2004, 2005) show the importance of local, independent media 
as a tool to decrease information costs.  Our variable, radio, is a dummy variable with value 
one if the community members reported to have access to at least one (private) radio outlet at 
the time of the survey; and zero otherwise.  Based on the results from our field research, this 
measure is the most important instrument to capture and quantify media access as radios play 
an important role in Madagascar.  We expect the presence of a radio station to decrease the 
likelihood of capture of cash transfers as one of the accompanying measures to increase 
public access to information on the newly implemented cash grant program – and hence to 
decrease the information costs of the intended beneficiaries – was its announcement on the 
  15radio.  As there was no specific mass media campaign on the in-kind contributions scheme, 
we expect to find a substantially smaller impact of radio on the likelihood of in-kind capture.    
Our second key explanatory variable is literacy, which is an indicator of human 
capital of the parents-teachers association and is measured as the average degree of literacy 
in the commune.  The variable is likely to capture two effects: higher human capital may 
cause lower monitoring costs and may make it easier to absorb information through the 
media.  To separate these effects out, we include both the level term and an interaction effect 
with the media variable in our analysis.  First, human capital is typically positively related to 
entrepreneurship and skills in various activities.  Higher educated beneficiaries below in the 
service delivery chain will have lower (bottom-up) monitoring costs as their capability to 
obtain information will be higher.  We expect that higher literacy rates i.e. more human 
capital endowments of the public, will increase the effectiveness of their monitoring and 
therefore, decrease the likelihood of capture by public officials.  However, consistent with 
our hypothesis that the monitoring costs of the in-kind grants scheme are higher than those of 
the cash grants scheme, we expect to find a bigger impact of literacy on the likelihood of 
cash - compared to in-kind - capture.   
In addition and as mentioned above, we include an interaction effect of literacy with 
the media variable (radio*literacy).  The information costs of the beneficiaries of the 
services do not only depend on the supply of information, e.g. through media, but also on the 
ability of people to process the information.  It is expected that radio and literacy each 
reduce capture, but that they are partly offsetting as more educated people have more human 
capital to obtain information from other sources than mass media.   
Fourth, different control variables are included in the analysis.  The choice of these 
variables is based on the conceptual framework developed in Francken et al. (2009).  The 
first control variable relates to the top-down monitoring cost and the importance of 
  16“remoteness” or geographical isolation in development, an issue emphasized in contributions 
by e.g. Krugman (1991) and Gallup et al. (1998).
12  District_capital measures the distance 
(in kilometers) from the district facility level to Antananarivo, the nation’s capital.  Given the 
general lack of infrastructure and means of transport in Madagascar, this variable is a valid 
measure of the geographical isolation of the district facilities.  Less remote districts i.e. 
compared to the agents above in the service delivery chain i.e. the central education 
authorities will be more easily accessible by the respective agents and thus imply lower 
inspection costs.  Consequently, it is expected that smaller distances to the districts from 
inspecting agents above in the education chain will lead to less capture at district level.   
The second control variable measures the quality and effectiveness of the local justice 
system.  The dummy variable red_district equals one if the district is officially a red or 
highly unsafe district (i.e. a district where more than 50% of the communes suffer from an 
extremely high insecurity level); and zero otherwise.  Consistent with earlier findings, we 
expect that highly unsafe districts will be characterized by higher probabilities of capture of 
both public funding instruments at district level. 
The third control variable measures the relative school size (schoolsize), quantified by 
the size of the public primary school as a percentage of the total size of all primary schools in 
the district.  According to the theory of Reinikka and Svensson (2004), the bargaining power 
of the school vis-à-vis the district officer will depend on her size i.e. a bigger school is 
expected to suffer less from local capture.    
The fourth control variable is a dummy for cyclical droughts (drought) that equals 
one if the commune was hit by two or more droughts, i.e. heavy income chocks, during the 
last four years (1998/2002).  Parents who have to deal with cyclical shocks will care more 
                                                 
12 They show that geographical isolation implies large welfare costs.  Krugman (1991) addresses the 
relationship between geography and international trade.  Gallup et al. (1998) investigate the ways in which 
location may have a direct impact on growth.  Fafchamps & Shilpi (2003) find that geographical isolation 
significantly reduces subjective welfare.  Fafchamps & Moser (2003) and Fafchamps & Minten (2006) show 
that remoteness is positively correlated with crime in Madagascar. 
  17about their family’s instant needs then about education, so we expect this variable to have a 
positive impact on capture.   
Finally, provincial dummies are included to account for additional fixed effects. 
 
6. Results 
6.1. Descriptive  statistics   
  Descriptive statistics are reported in Table 4.  The rows represent the different options 
for the district bureaucrats.  As explained above, more than half of the schools (53%) 
experienced capture.  Approximately one third (32%) of the schools did receive the cash 
funds, but not the in-kind contributions they were entitled to.  On the other hand, 13% of the 
schools experienced cash, but no in-kind capture.  Only 8% of the schools in our sample 
suffered from capture of both cash and in-kind grants.  
Comparing our key explanatory variables i.e. access to a radio outlet and the average 
literacy rate in the commune between the different categories reveals interesting results.   
Table 4 shows that a majority of the schools (80%) that did not suffer from capture had 
access to a radio.  This number is the same for the schools that suffered from capture of in-
kind contributions.  On the contrary, less than half of the schools (40%) that suffered from 
capture of cash grants had access to a radio.  Table 5 investigates the differences in greater 
detail and illustrates that a little more than half of the schools with radio access did not suffer 
from capture, approximately one third suffered from capture of in-kind transfers, and less 
than one sixth suffered from capture of cash grants (or full i.e. cash and in-kind capture).  
This compares to approximately one quarter of the schools without radio access that suffered 
from capture of in-kind grants and 39% from cash capture.  These descriptive results seem to 
support our first hypothesis that the decreased information costs of the cash grants scheme 
  18through its announcement via the radio has led to a lower incidence of local capture of cash 
transfers compared to in-kind contributions.    
 
The average literacy rate in the communes with schools that suffered from in-kind 
capture was 72%, very close to the average literary rate in communes with no capture in the 
primary education sector (74%).  On the contrary, the mean literacy rate in the communes 
with schools that suffered from capture of cash funds was substantially lower as it equaled 
44% (Table 4).  Table 5 shows that the majority of the schools (57%) in communes where 
more than half of the population was literate did not suffer from capture, one third suffered 
from capture of in-kind contributions and only 9% suffered from cash capture.  On the other 
hand, a high 65% of the schools in communes where less than half of the population was 
literate suffered from cash capture.  A little more than one fifth of these schools (23%) 
suffered from capture of in-kind funds.  These findings seem to support our second 
hypothesis concerning the difference in monitoring costs of the two public funding 
instruments.    
Furthermore, our descriptive results in Table 4 indicate that schools that suffered 
from cash capture were on average situated in districts that were more isolated from the 
capital; in highly unsafe districts and/or in communes that experienced frequent income 
shocks.    
 
6.2.  Results on the difference in capture 
  The estimation results are presented in Table 6.  To address the problem of any kind 
of intra-district correlation and arbitrary heteroskedasticity, we use robust standard errors that 
are adjusted for clustering on the districts.  Table 6 illustrates the results of our analysis with 
  19the two key explanatory variables, the interaction term, the provincial dummies, and the 
control variables.   
Radio is highly significant with a negative sign in all columns suggesting that access 
to a radio outlet decreases the likelihood of capture within the cash as well as the in-kind 
funding scheme.  More specifically, recalculating the impact of radio access at the mean of 
literacy illustrates that access to a radio outlet decreases the likelihood of capture of cash 
funds with 42 percentage points.
13  Table 6 shows that the effect of radio access is stronger 
on the likelihood of “cash” capture, which is consistent with the fact that the cash grants 
scheme received much more attention in the mass media.  Although the odds-ratio plot 
(Figure 2) shows that “in-kind” and “cash” capture are not significantly differentiated by 
radio access.  Hence, we can reject our first hypothesis and conclude that it is not the 
difference in information costs that is responsible for the difference in capture of the two 
public funding instruments.  On the other hand, the odds-ratio plot confirms that radio access 
significantly increases the odds of “no” capture relative to (cash or in-kind) capture which 
emphasizes the importance of independent regional media as tools in the fight against 
capture and corruption.   
Our second key variable, literacy, also shows to have a significant negative impact on 
“cash” as well as “in-kind” capture.  This finding indicates that capture of cash and in-kind 
programs is negatively related with the level of education of the intended beneficiaries, 
consistent with the hypothesis that monitoring costs, which are a function of local human 
capital, are an important factor.  More specifically, we find that a 10% increase of the 
average literacy rate in the commune is associated with a decrease in the probability of cash 
capture of 26 percentage points in the absence of radio access (Table 6).  Hence, promoting 
an increase in monitoring capacity and as a result intensive monitoring by the beneficiaries 
will decrease capture in the cash grants system.  On the other hand, the effect of literacy is 
                                                 
13 The recalculations are not reported in the tables. 
  20significantly weaker on the likelihood of capture of in-kind transfers.  A 10% increase of the 
average literacy rate in the commune is associated with a decrease in the probability of in-
kind capture of only 2 percentage points (in the absence of radio access).  The odds-ratio plot 
(Figure 2) confirms our results and shows that “no”, “in-kind” and “cash” capture are all 
three significantly differentiated by the level of education of the recipients.  The latter entails 
that a higher average literacy rate in the commune increases the odds of “in-kind” relative to 
“cash” capture.  This confirms our second hypothesis that higher monitoring costs of the in-
kind funding scheme make it more likely that capture of in-kind grants occurs compared to 
cash transfers.  It could also be an indication that intensive (bottom-up) monitoring by the 
beneficiaries of the services is not sufficient to eradicate capture.    
The interaction effect, radio*literacy, has a significant positive impact on the 
likelihood of “in-kind” capture implying that radio and literacy each reduce “in-kind” 
capture, but that their impacts are partly offsetting.  Although our findings suggest that the 
impact of radio access on “in-kind” capture is significant, the impact is rather small.  Our 
results recalculated at the mean of literacy suggest that access to a radio outlet decreases the 
likelihood of “in-kind” capture with 11 percentage points.  In sum, intensive monitoring 
together with increased public access to information (through the mass media) do not appear 
to be sufficient and should be combined with the use of the right, i.e. easily traceable, public 
funding instrument (as in our case study cash grants) in order to eradicate capture. 
In addition, we find that a higher distance between the capital and the district facility 
level increases the probability of “cash” and of “in-kind” capture compared to the reference 
state of “no” capture as district_capital is significant with a positive sign in all columns in 
Table 5.  This finding is consistent with the results of Olken (2005) and Francken et al. 
(2009).  The inspection cost of the central monitoring agencies will increase with the 
geographical isolation of the district and therefore more remote districts will experience less 
  21control from the centre and thus suffer more from local capture.  More specifically, we can 
conclude that being 100km closer to the centre is associated with a decrease in the 
probability of “cash” and “in-kind” capture of 15 and 2 percentage points respectively 
compared to the reference state of “no” capture.  These results seem to indicate that, besides 
the aforementioned difference in bottom-up monitoring costs, there is also a difference in 
top-down monitoring costs (i.e. the monitoring costs of the donor of the services) between 
the two instruments of public funding implementation.  Though, a more detailed analysis on 
this matter is beyond the scope of this paper and future research should be encouraged to 
confirm this result.     
      Schools situated in highly unsafe districts or in communes that suffered from cyclical 
droughts experience a higher likelihood of capture of “cash” and “in-kind” grants compared 
to the reference state of “no” capture.  Red_district and drought both appear to be significant 
with a positive sign in all columns of Table 5.  More specifically, our findings suggest that 
living in a highly insecure district will increase the probability of “cash” capture with 65 
percentage points, at the means of all other variables and compared to the reference state of 
“no” capture.  Schools that are situated in areas suffering from cyclical droughts will show an 
80 percentage points’ higher probability of “cash” capture.   
 
6.3.  Additional tests and discussion 
We explored several potential concerns with the analysis.  First, as there might be 
some concern that we combine two different scenario’s in option 3 i.e. cash with in-kind and 
cash without in-kind capture and that the reported discrepancies in the former scenario could 
mainly be driven by incompetence rather than capture, we conducted our analyses without 
those schools that reported both “cash” and “in-kind” capture.  The results are illustrated in 
Table 7 and are partly consistent with our earlier findings.  A higher education level of the 
  22intended recipients decreases the likelihood of “cash” as well as “in-kind” capture of funds.  
Yet, the impact of literacy is considerably smaller on “in-kind” compared to “cash” capture.  
Radio access also significantly reduces the likelihood of “cash” as well as “in-kind” capture.  
However, the marginal effect of radio on “cash” capture appears to be considerably smaller 
than the marginal effect of radio on “in-kind” capture which does not correspond with our 
previous results.   
Second, as we are merely interested in cash versus in-kind capture, we decided to 
only take those schools into account that suffered from “cash” or “in-kind” capture.  Our 
dummy variable in-kind_cash equals one if the schools reported to have suffered from “in-
kind” capture (and not from “cash” capture); and zero otherwise.  The results in Table 8 
show that a higher average literacy rate of the beneficiaries will significantly increase the 
likelihood of “in-kind” capture compared to “cash” capture.  This confirms our earlier 
findings and suggests that the difference in capture is not due to the difference in information 
costs but due to the difference in monitoring costs of the two public funding instruments.  It 
could also be an indication that intensive (bottom-up) monitoring by the beneficiaries of the 
services is not sufficient and should be combined with the use of the right public funding 
instrument in order to eradicate capture. 
Third, one could argue that the placement of radio towers is not an exogenous 
process.  To correct for potential bias, we looked more closely into matching schools with 
similar observable characteristics, and only different in radio access.  We tried to apply 
matching techniques from the average treatment effects literature to estimate the impact of 
radio access on the likelihood of both “in-kind” (versus no) capture and “in-kind” versus 
“cash” capture.  However, our data did not allow for estimating the average treatment effects 
due to a lack of matched control units.  More specifically, the sample size of schools with 
information on “in-kind” capture is already smaller than the sample size of schools with 
  23information on “cash” capture.  Matching schools considerably reduced the sample size, 
leading to a lack of matched control units.      
Fourth, to test for the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA), we conducted a 
Hausman and a Small-Hsiao test.  In results not reported in the tables, the IIA holds 
according to the Hausman test, but is violated in the Small-Hsiao test.  However, Long and 
Freese (2006) state that this is very common, and it often indicates that the IIA has not been 
violated.  McFadden (1973) suggests that models estimated with multinomial logit should 
only be used if outcome categories can be plausibly differentiated and weighed 
independently by decision-makers.  We believe the latter to be the case as in our example the 
district bureaucrats can clearly distinguish and choose between no capture, capture within the 
cash transfers and/or the in-kind contributions scheme.  
Fifth, there could be some potential problems with including the average literacy rate 
in the commune in the model as such.  There could be a selection bias as active families 
choose to live in communes with a higher educational level i.e. higher literacy rates and these 
families also monitor school funding better.  However, Madagascar has a particular 
geographical composition and rather low internal migration.  Hence, we do not believe 
selection bias is of a major concern.  Moreover, we partly control for it by comparing two 
different public funding schemes.  Finally, if selection bias would be the case, we would also 
expect that the active families would be able to monitor the in-kind funding system better, 
but our results do not indicate the latter.  
In summary, our findings seem to suggest that the difference in monitoring costs of 
the two public funding instruments is responsible for a higher prevalence of in-kind capture 
compared to cash capture.  This could indicate that intensive monitoring is not sufficient and 
should be promoted in combination with the right instrument of public funding 
implementation in order to curb capture.  
  247. Conclusion 
This paper has used data on public education expenditures in Madagascar to 
investigate how the choice of instrument of public funding implementation affects capture.  
More specifically, we measure capture of cash versus in-kind funds from district to school 
level.  The cash funding system is newly implemented since the beginning of the school year 
in which the survey was conducted (2002-2003) and is accompanied by several measures to 
increase public access to information.  On the other hand, the in-kind funding system is 
characterized by a general lack of transparency and accountability.  
First, we find that local capture of in-kind funds was much higher than capture of 
cash transfers.  The central estimates are that 21% of the schools did not receive the cash 
grants they were entitled to; compared to a high 40% that did not receive all in-kind 
contributions they were supposed to receive.  Capture was more likely to be found in highly 
unsafe and more remote districts and in areas that suffer regularly from cyclical droughts. 
Second, local presence of mass media significantly decreases capture of cash as well 
as in-kind transfers.  This result is consistent with findings of Reinikka and Svensson (2005) 
and confirms that independent regional media can be important tools in the fight against 
capture and corruption.      
Third, capture of cash transfers is negatively related with the level of education of the 
intended beneficiaries, consistent with the hypothesis that monitoring costs, which are a 
function of local human capital, are an important factor.  On the other hand, we find a 
significantly weaker relationship with the in-kind transfer programs.  This result could 
indicate that enhanced monitoring by the intended beneficiaries is not sufficient to eradicate 
capture.    
Finally, our findings taken together have implications for the debate on capture in 
public services.  Intensive monitoring, together with increased public access to information 
  25through the mass media do not appear to be sufficient.  Our results suggest that these 
measures should be combined with the use of the right, i.e. easily traceable, public funding 
instrument in order to eliminate capture and corruption. 
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Figure 2: Odds-ratio plot 
 
  30Table 1: Capture of cash and in-kind contributions 
Capture of IN-KIND contributions     
In % of observations 
 
No Yes  Total  Nr. of obs. 
No 47 32  79  123 
Capture of CASH funds 
Yes 13  8  21  33 
 Total  60  40  100  156 
  Nr. of obs.  94  62  156   
 
Table 2: Perceived clarity of bookkeeping versus discrepancies in cash/in-kind funds 
PERCEIVED CLARITY  In % of observations 
CLEAR NOT  CLEAR 






Discrepancies in…     
        1/ IN-KIND funds  69  31 
        2/ CASH funds  75  25 
        3/ CASH & IN-KIND funds  38  62 
Source: Francken, 2003. 
 
Table 3: Mean invoice and retail prices at district facility level (school year 2002-2003) 
Material  Mean invoice price at 
Cisco level (in FMg) 
Mean retail price at 
district level (in FMg) 
Invoice price difference 
Pen  1,414   1,177   + 20% 
Slate  3,171   2,822   + 12% 
Notebook 50 pages  2,088   1,525   + 37% 
Glue  5,816   3,203   + 82% 
Source: Francken, 2003; Note: In 2002, the Francs Malagasy was the legal currency in Madagascar. 
 
Table 4: Description of the dataset 
CAPTURE    NO* IN-KIND** CASH***  
Variable  Unit  Mean Mean Mean 
Information cost 
Radio  Dummy  0.8 0.8 0.4 
Monitoring cost       
Literacy  Percent 73.9  72.1  43.5 
Control variables 
District_capital  Km  461.9 550.3 820.0 
Red_district  Dummy  0.2 0.3 0.5 
Schoolsize  Percent  1.2 1.4 0.8 
Drought  Dummy  0.1 0.4 0.5 
Observations    74 49 33 
Note: * Option 1 (base category); ** Option 2; *** Option 3 
 
Table 5: Radio coverage and literacy rates 
CAPTURE   NO* IN-KIND** CASH***  
  Nr. of obs.  % of obs.  % of obs.  % of obs. 
Radio coverage       
No  46  37 24 39 
Yes  110  52 34 14 
Literacy rate (in %)       
0-50  34  12 23 65 
51-100 122  57  34  9 
Note: * Option 1 (base category); ** Option 2; *** Option 3 
  31Table 6: Multinomial regression results with no capture (option 1) as base category 
  IN-KIND capture  CASH capture 
  Coeff. z-value  Marg.  Eff.
1  Coeff. z-value  Marg.  Eff.
1 
Radio  -7.881     -3.83*** -0.333  -6.310   -2.10** -0.594
 
Literacy  -0.094     -2.97***  -0.002  -0.162     -3.67*** -0.026 
Radio* literacy  0.109       3.37*** 0.003  0.062  1.21  0.010 
Control variables  YES 
District_capital  0.008     2.40**  0.000  0.009      2.78*** 0.001 
Red_district  1.559     2.02**  0.007  3.460      2.71*** 0.646 
Schoolsize  0.100 0.40  0.002 0.177  0.58  0.029 
Drought  2.266     2.41**  0.003  4.659      3.87*** 0.796 
Provincial Dummies
  YES 
No. observations  156 
Pseudo R2  0.407 
Note: 
1Marginal effects, but discrete changes are reported for dummy variables; Robust standard errors adjusted 
for clustering on districts; significance levels of 10, 5 and 1% are represented by *, ** and ***.   
 
Table 7: Multinomial regression results with no capture (option 1) as base category and 
excluding the observations with inconsistencies in reports on both cash and in-kind funds  
  IN-KIND capture  CASH capture 
  Coeff. z-value  Marg.  Eff.
1  Coeff. z-value  Marg.  Eff.
1 
Radio  -9.790     -2.95*** -0.869  -5.726  -1.87* -0.100
 
Literacy  -0.107     -3.44***  -0.003  -0.181     -3.76*** -0.010 
Radio* literacy  0.136       2.90*** 0.004  0.045  0.89  0.002 
Control variables  YES 
District_capital  0.009     2.32**  0.001  0.008    2.39** 0.001 
Red_district  1.885     2.12** 0.066 2.251  1.59  0.198 
Schoolsize  0.075 0.32  0.002 0.063  0.16  0.003 
Drought  2.818     2.13**  0.041  5.227      2.94*** 0.700 
Provincial Dummies
  YES 
No. observations  143 
Pseudo R2  0.384 
Note: 
1Marginal effects, but discrete changes are reported for dummy variables; Robust standard errors adjusted 
for clustering on districts; significance levels of 10, 5 and 1% are represented by *, ** and ***.   
 
  32Table 8: Probit regression results with cash capture as base category 
  IN-KIND capture 
  Coeff. z-value  Marg.  Eff.
1 
Radio  -0.094 -0.06  -0.018 
Literacy  0.073        3.64*** 0.014 
Radio* literacy  0.014 0.56  0.003 
Control variables  YES 
District_capital  0.001 0.23  0.001 
Red_district  -1.045 -1.15  -0.204 
Schoolsize  0.059 0.26  0.012 
Drought  -1.130 -1.40  -0.221 
Provincial Dummies
  YES 
No. observations  69 
Pseudo R2  0.424 
Note: 
1Marginal effects, but discrete changes are reported for dummy variables; Robust standard errors adjusted 
for clustering on districts; significance levels of 10, 5 and 1% are represented by *, ** and ***.   
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B.1.   Data description 
Capture of cash funds = dummy variable with value one if there was a discrepancy between HIPC 
cash funds recorded as sent by the district facility level and noted as received in the public 
primary school records; and zero otherwise (Source: Budget Tracking Survey, 2003);  
 
Capture of in-kind contributions = dummy variable with value one if there was a discrepancy 
between the in-kind contributions recorded as sent by the district facility level and noted as 
received in the public primary school records; and zero otherwise (Source: Budget Tracking 
Survey, 2003); 
 
Radio = dummy variable with value one if the people reported to have clear access to at least one 
(private) regional radio station people in the commune (Source: Post-crisis Survey, 2002);  
 
Literacy = the literacy rate in the commune (Source: National Population Census, 1993); 
 
District_capital  = the distance in kilometers from the district facility level to Antananarivo, the 
capital of Madagascar (Sources: Post-crisis Survey, 2002; Commune Census, 2001); 
 
Red_district = dummy variable with value one if the district is officially declared as a red or highly 
unsafe district, which means a district where more than 50% of the communes suffer from an 
extremely high insecurity level (Source: Commune Census, 2001);  
 
Schoolsize = the size of the public primary school as a percentage of the total size of all primary 
schools, public as well as private, in the district (Source: Cornell University Education Survey, 
2003; Budget Tracking Survey, 2003);  
 
Drought = dummy variable of cyclical droughts equals one if the commune suffered from two or 
more droughts during the last four years (1998-2002); and zero otherwise (Source: Commune 
Census, 2001).  
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